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The investigation found that when departing from Tunis on the Tunis-Bari route taken before Flight 1153, the captain found that the plane's fuel level seemed to have increased, but he did not find a refueling slip. The captain took off for Bari without confirming the existence of the refueling slip; there was no slip because the plane was not refueled. In Bari the plane took fuel to a level where the incorrect indicator showed 2,700 kilograms. The correct indicator would have shown 540 kilograms for the Bari-Djerba route. Giuseppe Caldarelli, an investigator, said that the ATR could have reached Palermo with the tail wind. During a two engine flame out crews can feather the propellers to change the angle that the wind hits the propellers, so the plane could glide for a longer period of time. The Tuninter 1153 crew did not feather the propellers. When the second engine failed, the crew did not lower the aircraft's speed to match the ATR 72's optimal gliding speed, in which the aircraft could glide the furthest. A simulator pilot at ATR's facility in France tested the same scenario; in his test he could get the ATR 72 to Palermo by feathering the propellers and reducing the speed to the optimal gliding speed. The simulator pilots were not in imminent danger, and they had chosen to glide. The captain of the ATR did not know that his aircraft was out of fuel and focused on trying to restart the engines; the procedure to do so does not include feathering the propellers. When that did not work, the captain focused on selecting a place to ditch the aircraft. The captain had no instruments and experienced radio interruptions. Before impact Gharbi raised the ATR's nose by nine degrees so that the plane glided across the water surface instead of hitting the ocean head on; this likely allowed the survivors to escape the aircraft. The final investigative report suggested that airlines train their pilots to deal with unusual situations.